Welfare State Expenditures and the Distribution of Child Opportunities by Garfinkel, Irwin et al.
Syracuse University 
SURFACE 
Center for Policy Research Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs 
2004 
Welfare State Expenditures and the Distribution of Child 
Opportunities 
Irwin Garfinkel 
Lee Rainwater 
Timothy M. Smeeding 
Syracuse University, Maxwell School, Center for Policy Research 
Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/cpr 
 Part of the Social Welfare Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Garfinkel, Irwin; Rainwater, Lee; and Smeeding, Timothy M., "Welfare State Expenditures and the 
Distribution of Child Opportunities" (2004). Center for Policy Research. 100. 
https://surface.syr.edu/cpr/100 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public 
Affairs at SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Center for Policy Research by an authorized administrator 
of SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu. 
ISSN: 1525-3066 
 
 
 
Center for Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 63 
 
 
WELFARE STATE EXPENDITURES AND THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF CHILD OPPORTUNITIES 
 
 
Irwin Garfinkel, Lee Rainwater,  
and Timothy M. Smeeding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Center for Policy Research 
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs 
Syracuse University 
426 Eggers Hall 
Syracuse, New York 13244-1020 
(315) 443-3114 | Fax (315) 443-1081 
e-mail: ctrpol@syr.edu
 
 
 
 
October 2004 
(Revised from June 2004) 
 
 
$5.00 
 
 
 
Up-to-date information about CPR’s research projects and other activities is 
available from our World Wide Web site at www-cpr.maxwell.syr.edu. All 
recent working papers and Policy Briefs can be read and/or printed from 
there as well. 
CENTER FOR POLICY RESEARCH – Fall 2004 
 
Timothy Smeeding, Director 
Professor of Economics & Public Administration 
__________ 
 
Associate Directors 
 
Margaret Austin Douglas Holtz-Eakin 
Associate Director, Professor of Economics 
Budget and Administration Associate Director, Center for Policy Research 
  
Douglas Wolf John Yinger 
Professor of Public Administration Professor of Economics and Public Administration 
Associate Director, Aging Studies Program Associate Director, Metropolitan Studies Program 
 
SENIOR RESEARCH ASSOCIATES 
 
Pablo Beramendi……………...……Political Science 
Dan Black............................................... Economics 
Lloyd Blanchard……………….Public Administration 
Stacy Dickert-Conlin............................... Economics 
William Duncombe ................. Public Administration 
Gary Engelhardt ....................................Economics 
Deborah Freund ....................Public Administration 
Madonna Harrington Meyer .....................Sociology 
Christine Himes........................................Sociology 
William C. Horrace .................................Economics 
Bernard Jump ........................Public Administration 
Duke Kao ...............................................Economics 
Eric Kingson ........................................ Social Work 
Thomas Kniesner ..................................Economics 
Jeff Kubik ...............................................Economics 
 
Andrew London......................................... Sociology 
Len Lopoo ................................Public Administration 
Jerry Miner .............................................. Economics 
John Moran ............................................. Economics 
Jan Ondrich............................................. Economics 
John Palmer.............................Public Administration 
Lori Ploutz-Snyder ... Health and Physical Education 
Jeff Racine .............................................. Economics 
Grant Reeher ..................................Political Science 
Stuart Rosenthal ..................................... Economics 
Ross Rubenstein......................Public Administration 
Margaret Usdansky………………………...Sociology 
Michael Wasylenko ................................. Economics 
Janet Wilmoth ........................................... Sociology 
 
GRADUATE ASSOCIATES 
 
Anna Amirkhanyan.................Public Administration 
Megan Bahns………………………………Sociology 
Sonali Ballal…………………..Public Administration 
Dana Balter ............................Public Administration 
Sami Beg………………………Public Administration 
Yong Chen .............................................Economics 
Seokjoon Choi…………………………….Economics 
Christopher Cunningham .......................Economics 
Ana Dammert .........................................Economics 
Ron Dhali……………………………….....Economics 
Mike Eriksen ..........................................Economics 
Ying Fang…………………………………...Sociology 
Katie Fitzpatrick……………………….....Economics 
Jose Galdo.............................................Economics 
Alexandre Genest…………… Public Administration 
Andrew Hanson…………………………...Economics 
Hatice Karahan……………………………Economics 
Kristina Lambright ...................Public Administration 
Jessica Lee……………………Public Administration 
Liqun Liu. ................................................ Economics 
Long Liu……………………………………Economics 
Joseph Marchand ................................... Economics 
Emily NaPier………………………………..Sociology 
Emily Pas ............................................... Economics 
Kristenne Robison…………………………Sociology 
Cynthia Searcy...................... Public Administration 
Claudia Smith........................................ Economics 
Mark Thomas…………………Public Administration 
Jeff Thompson………………..Public Administration 
Wen Wang………………………………...Economics 
Bo Zhao……………………………………Economics 
 
 
STAFF
 
Kelly Bogart ....................Administrative Secretary 
Martha Bonney....Publications/Events Coordinator 
Karen Cimilluca..........Librarian/Office Coordinator 
Kim Desmond ................ Administrative Secretary 
Kati Foley .....................Administrative Assistant, LIS 
Kitty Nasto.......................... Administrative Secretary 
Candi Patterson ...................... Computer Consultant 
Mary Santy......................... Administrative Secretary 
Abstract  
This paper estimates the redistributive effects of welfare state expenditures on social and 
economic disparities in the economic well-being of citizens in ten nations. Data from the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and other sources for cash 
and non-cash social welfare benefits (health and education benefits from third parties) are used to 
describe differences in the size and nature of welfare states and their distributional effects. The 
OECD data are combined with micro data on household incomes from the Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS) both to estimate the redistributive effects of the expenditures and taxes and to 
construct measures of the differences in the relative standard of living among the population at 
various points in the income distributions of their countries. Estimates are provided for country 
populations as a whole and for three mutually exclusive groups: all persons; non-aged persons 
living with children; non-aged without children at home; and the elderly. These measures may be 
thought of as capturing the degree to which welfare states at the end of the 20th and dawn of the 
21st century provide for the developmental needs and capabilities of their populations in terms of 
cash, access to health care and educational opportunity.  
The results indicate a wide range of differences in levels of economic resources and 
support, within as well as between, nations and groups. The degree to which children have fair 
and equal opportunity chances; the degree to which the population has access to quality health 
care ; and the population groups who are most called upon( most taxed) to provide these benefits 
are all investigated here. Non-cash benefits are particularly important for low-income 
Americans: especially elders and children and their families and should not be taken for granted 
by analysts of the welfare state. Counting in kind benefits at government cost substantially 
reduces cross national differences in market and cash disposable incomes, but does not eliminate 
them. The results are very sensitive to how in-kind benefits are measured and valued.  
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I. Introduction 
 The purpose of this paper is to describe the size, nature, and redistributive effects of 
welfare state expenditures in ten advanced industrialized nations and to relate these to 
differences across nations to disparities in the economic well-being of three populations groups: 
children (and their families); elders; and childless adult households. Efforts are made to provide 
a decent standard living and access to health care for the elderly in every modern rich nation. 
Equality of opportunity for children and a fair chance at life’s opportunities are something that 
all nations aspire to provide to each and every child. These policies affect human development 
and human needs, social exclusion or inclusion, and the way that we judge societies more 
generally. For instance, elders are major beneficiaries of social retirement and health care 
benefits and the cost and benefits of polices for aging populations are fiscally important in every 
rich nation (especially in the ones studied here; see Forster, et. al., 2004; Binstock, et. al. 2002). 
And President Bush in America has recently vowed to “leave no child behind,” while Prime 
Minister Blair in the United Kingdom has vowed to halve child poverty in ten years and 
eliminate it in twenty (Bradshaw 2003). The belief that every person should be provided with a 
decent education, basic health care, and a satisfactory standard of living permeate the United 
Nations Human Development Reports and their Millennium Development Goals. These goals 
echo Amartya Sen’s notion that every person should be provided with capabilities to succeed in 
life be they old, young or in between (Sen 1992). 
The nations we choose to investigate here include the four largest predominately English 
speaking nations, Australia, Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. To place the 
English speaking nations in broader (European and Nordic/Scandinavian) context, we also 
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include Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden. We doubt that 
inclusion of additional rich OECD nations would change the patterns we find here. 
For each country, we begin with market income and rank the population of all households 
by equivalent household market income. We then add cash transfers and non-cash benefits for 
health care and education, including early childhood education (all valued at government cost) 
and subtract the taxes paid to finance these social transfers for the entire population. Total 
transfers just equal taxes for the whole population. The LIS data give us good estimates of the 
distribution of cash expenditures and income and consumption data allow us to do relatively 
accurate simulations of the tax burdens across income classes. We assume fairly equal 
distributions of publicly financed health and education expenditures in all nations. Only 
employer provided health care in the United States differs in this regard.  
Post direct-tax, post cash transfer incomes, which we call cash disposable income, is the 
usual measure of well being offered in comparative terms (Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding 
1995). But we go far beyond that measure here. Post- all tax, post -all transfer income, which we 
call “full income,” is a more comprehensive measure than disposable income. In the past, the 
difference between market income and disposable income has been used as a crude accounting 
measure of the redistributive effect of cash welfare state expenditures. The difference between 
market income and full income is a better measure than the difference between market income 
and disposable cash income for assessing the efforts of welfare states to redistribute 
opportunities and access to critical goods for human development and well-being. Differences 
between market and full income across the income distribution are also a more comprehensive 
measure of the relative costs (in terms of taxes paid) and value of benefits in different countries 
than are differences between market and disposable income. 
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To the extent that the transfers we add induce changes in work, savings, or marriage 
behavior, both measures are biased. Moreover the measure reflects transfers over the life course 
as well as transfers across lifetime or permanent income groups (see Paglin 1975; Falkingham 
and Hills 1995). But, they are useful first approximations of the net redistributive effects of the 
welfare state (see also Lindert 2004). Other perspectives—inter temporal or inter generational—
may offer a different view. For instance, if there is a great deal of mobility over time or across 
generations within any nation, these points in time views will be biased. But they are a good 
starting point. 
Linking the welfare state “inputs” of cash, education, and health transfers to “outputs” 
such as health status, quality of life, educational attainment, and economic and social well-being, 
is the ultimate test of the success or failure of these efforts (For instance, see Phipps 2004). Our 
aim in this paper is less ambitious—to measure the degree to which social welfare expenditures 
close the gap in economic resources afforded to poor versus middle-income and poor and middle 
income versus rich adults, children and elders in rich countries.  
 
II. Data and Methods 
We use several data sources compiled by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and others (Gornick and Meyers 2003) to construct our measures of 
welfare state expenditures. Most of the aggregate public expenditure data is derived from the 
OECD 1980-1998: 20 Years of Social Expenditure – the OECD Database (2002c), with the 
exception of education data, which is derived from OECD Education at a Glance (2002b) and 
early childhood education (ECE), which come from Gornick and Meyers (2003). The OECD 
Social Expenditure Database includes the following categories of social benefits: old-age cash 
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benefits; disability cash benefits; occupational injury and disease; sickness benefits; services for 
the elderly and disabled; survivors; family cash benefits; family services; active labor market 
policies; unemployment compensation; housing benefits; public health expenditure; and other 
contingencies (e.g., cash benefits to those with low income). Such benefits may be cash transfers 
or the direct in-kind provision of goods and services. A detailed rationale for, and accounting of, 
these benefits is provided in The OECD Social Expenditure Database 1980-1997 (2002c). 
Employer provided benefits and aggregate tax expenditures are also derived from data compiled 
by the OECD and the Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI 2004; Adema 2001). 
The OECD categories are re-arranged as follows: pensions include old age, disability, 
survivors insurance and employer provided pension benefits; health includes public health 
expenditures (Medicare and Medicaid in the United States) and employer provided health 
benefits; education includes public expenditures on formal day care, primary, secondary and 
post-secondary education as well as Head Start in the United States. Other cash transfers include 
occupational injury and disease, sickness, unemployment compensation, family allowance, 
parental leave, other contingencies, child welfare, family cash benefits and tax breaks for social 
purposes that are similar to cash1, other in-kind benefits include services for the elderly and 
disabled, family services (food stamps, low income home energy assistance, women and children 
nutrition programs) and active labor market programs; and housing includes cash housing 
subsidies for countries other than the United States and public housing and housing vouchers in 
the United States.  
While data on public benefits encompasses expenditures paid and controlled by all levels 
of government (federal, state and local), the quality of the data varies across countries, 
particularly with respect to lower tiers of government (OECD 2002c). The country data is also 
 
 
6
limited with respect to housing and tax expenditures. The OECD housing data includes only cash 
expenditures; in-kind and tax expenditures for housing are omitted. Therefore we do not include 
housing tax expenditures for the United States. Tax expenditures in general are not included in 
the micro data presented here, except as they are already reflected in the lower taxes which LIS 
households pay. Similarly, we are not able to easily identify students in higher education and are 
therefore unable to accurately distribute post-secondary education benefits. On the other hand we 
include the full range of available ECE benefits, not only Head Start and larger national 
programs. 
The micro data that we use for this analysis are from the Luxembourg Income Study 
(LIS) database, which now contains over 135 household income data files for 29 nations 
covering the period 1967 to 2002 (www.lisproject.org). For this paper, as noted above, we limit 
the analysis to ten nations, and their most recent datasets. Within each country, we begin with the 
LIS measure of household market income (earnings plus private pensions and income from 
assets) and add employer payroll taxes (and in the United States, employer provided health 
insurance) to earnings in order to get a pre-tax, pre-transfer estimate of market income.2  
For cross-national comparisons of inequality, the household is the single best unit for 
income aggregation. It is the only comparable income-sharing unit available for most nations, 
including all those used in this paper. While the household is the unit used for aggregating 
income, the person is the unit of analysis. Household income is assumed to be equally shared 
among all individuals within a household. A variety of equivalence scales have been used in 
cross-national comparisons, in order to make comparisons of well-being between households 
with differing compositions. We adjust household incomes to reflect differences in household 
size by dividing income by the square root of household size as this measure does not unduly 
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bias measures towards large units (with children) or smaller units (with elders) (Atkinson, 
Rainwater, and Smeeding 1995). 
Imputations 
We then add cash transfers and non-cash benefits for health care and education, including 
early childhood education (all valued at government cost) and subtract the taxes paid to finance 
these social transfers. This measure of full income is then divided by the square root of 
household size to obtain equivalent full income per person. Within each country, the taxes 
subtracted from income equal the social transfers received for the population as a whole. 
(Though taxes and benefits are equal for the entire population within each nation, our sub-group 
analysis focuses on households with elders or children or only adults, where taxes paid may be 
less or more than transfers received). The LIS data give us good estimates of the distribution of 
cash expenditures and the income and earnings data, along with consumption data for several 
countries, allow us to do relatively accurate simulations of the tax burdens across income classes. 
Payroll taxes are assumed to be proportional to individual earnings up to maximums, which vary 
across countries. Property taxes are assumed to be proportional to housing consumption for both 
owners and renters. Sales and value added taxes are assumed to be proportional to total 
consumption. Decile specific consumption to income ratios are taken from micro data surveys 
for four nations (Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and an average of 
the four is applied to other nations.  
With the exception of health in the United States, we assume an equal distribution of 
health and education expenditures across the income distribution within all nations. We use 
OECD estimates of health care spending per capita and elementary education and secondary 
education spending per enrolled person taken from their Health Data (OECD 2002a) and 
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Education at a Glance (OECD 2002b) databases for each nation. Based on recent cross-national 
research on the cost of health care by age groups in OECD countries (Smeeding and Freund 
2002), we assume health care spending for children 18 years old or less is equal to .75 of the 
average government cost of subsidized health care per capita (or government plus employer 
subsidized health care in the United States) and 1.0; 1.25; 1.75; 3.0; and 4.0 times the average, 
respectively, for adults aged 19-34; 35-54; 55-64; 65-74; and 75+ in each nation. This measure is 
often called the “insurance value” of benefits, because it measures the amount of money per 
person of each age type that would have to be paid in to just cover benefits received by that 
group (Smeeding, 1982). Each person of a given age receives this benefit regardless of actual 
health care usage. 
Because the United States, alone among the nations examined, does not have a universal 
national health insurance or health service, the imputations were more complicated. Using data 
from EBRI and the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMMS) on overall average 
expenditures per covered recipient, and the percent of individuals in each quintile of household 
income who are recipients of charity benefits as uninsured, or who are insured by their employer, 
or by Medicare or by other public programs (principally Medicaid), the average expenditure per 
person in that quintile is imputed ( and then adjusted for the age of the individual as specified 
above to get to the insurance value). For uninsured persons, we imputed a lower amount 
consistent with the amount of unpaid care received by the uninsured in the 1998 Medical Care 
Expenditure Survey (MEPS) as provided by Barbara Wolfe (2002). Expenditures for care 
provided to the uninsured are, on average, about half the amount provided to an insured person. 
Employer benefits were derived from EBRI estimates. Medicaid and Medicare figures were 
taken from the Green Book (U.S. Congress 2004) and from the CMMS webpage. 
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Education spending is set equal to the spending per elementary and secondary school 
child in every country as estimated by OECD (2002b). Finally, we utilize OECD data and data 
from Gornick and Meyers (2003) and Meyers (2003) to add the value of early childhood 
education expenditures (for children between the ages of three and school starting age, normally 
5 in most nations). 
For the LIS simulations we ignore tertiary education benefits and all other non-cash 
benefits for youth including child care subsidies for children under age three.3 Omitting tertiary 
education is a serious limitation, but the LIS provides insufficient data to allow us to impute its 
value to families. Elementary and secondary education and health care cover the vast majority of 
children’s non-cash benefits in every nation studied. Similarly, hospital and physician and 
pharmaceutical services provided to the elderly make up the bulk of their health care subsidies. 
We also implicitly include the insurance value of publicly provided nursing home services for 
the non-institutionalized population from the Medicaid program in the United States and for 
publicly provided chronic care in other nations as well. See appendix for more detail on these 
imputations and sources. 
Measure of Redistributive Effects 
For each country as a whole, the benefits and taxes are equal across the entire population. 
In this paper, we present results for all households, for those with children (under 18), for the 
elderly (over 65), and for households without children headed by a non-elderly person4. 
The difference between market income and post-tax, post transfer incomes by decile is a 
crude accounting measure of the redistributive effect of welfare state expenditures. To the extent 
that the transfers induce changes in work, savings, or marriage behavior, this measure is biased. 
But it is a useful first approximation. The difference between market income and post-tax, post 
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transfer income, which we call full income, is a better measure than the difference between 
market income and post-tax, post transfer disposable cash income for assessing the efforts of 
welfare states to redistribute capabilities, access to services and opportunities. All taxes are 
included in full income, especially indirect ones such as the value added tax (VAT) as well as the 
largest and most visible non cash benefits in the form of health care and education. Differences 
in full income across the income distribution are therefore a better measure of fiscal effects of 
governments on the relative well-being in different countries than are differences in cash 
incomes. (Because benefits may be worth less to low income families than government cost, at 
the end of the analysis, we examine the sensitivity of our results to alternative valuations.) 
We use these data to compute the full income of a low-income, the median-income, and a 
high-income person in each nation. The low-income person is measured at the 10th percentile 
(median of the bottom quintile) while the high-income person is measured at the 90th percentile 
(median of the top quintile) of full income. We further refer to the difference between persons 
living in families with high- and low- full incomes as “economic distance” in making the 
comparisons which follow. We like to think of the measure of economic distance as a measure of 
equality of provision (for adults and elders) or equality of opportunity (for children) within each 
nation. Nations with smaller economic distances (or smaller decile ratios) have more “equality of 
provision” or “equality of opportunity” across the population. We also like to focus on the 
distance between the middle-income person and the low-income person as a measure of 
“provision for the poor” for adults and elders, or “fair chance” for children. All of this is 
designed to show which nations provide critically important socials goods, like health care, for 
elders and adults. For children, they show which nations might leave their children behind, 
which ones give them a good start, and by how much.  
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III. Differences in Welfare State Expenditures among Ten Advanced 
Industrial Nations  
 
Figure 1 displays aggregate social welfare benefits as a proportion of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) for each of the ten nations we examine. Aggregate or gross social welfare 
benefits are defined to include tax expenditures and employer provided health insurance and 
retirement benefits.5 Although other nations also have employer provided retirement pensions, 
the United States private system is larger and none, save the United States, has employer 
provided health insurance6 In addition, we show the value of net benefits after adjustments for 
the taxing back of cash benefits and for sales and value added taxes that reduce the real 
purchasing power of cash benefits. 
First, all of the countries spend a substantial fraction—at least one fourth―of their 
GDP’s on social welfare. There is also evidence that in terms of where the dollars go, most of 
what governments in fact do is to tax one set of persons and transfer benefits to another. When 
social welfare benefits are added to exhaustive government outlays (as in the Systems of 
National Accounts) as a measure of total government spending, social benefits are at the very 
least 68 percent of government outlays (Australia) and up to 91 percent (Sweden) of total outlays 
(Osberg, Smeeding and Schwabish, 2004). 
Second, there is some variation within the English speaking countries, with the United 
States spending nearly as much as the United Kingdom, but less than Canada and Australia w 
owing mainly to employer spending for health and pensions. Indeed, if employer provided health 
insurance and pensions are subtracted from the United States, total social welfare expenditures 
would amount to only 20 percent. Third, and most important, in the broader context of the 
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continental West European and Scandinavian nations, the differences among the English 
speaking nations are relatively small compared to the differences between the English speaking 
nations and the continental European and Scandinavian nations. The English speaking nations 
spend the least, the European nations substantially more, and the Scandinavian nations spend the 
most. These patterns are consistent with findings of other comparative studies (Kamerman and 
Kahn 1978; Smeeding, O’Higgins, and Rainwater 1990; Esping-Andersen 1990; Smeeding 
2004).  
Most of the differences are attributable to history, culture, and political choices. The 
Scandinavian countries have strong labor movements and social democratic parties that are 
committed to reducing class and gender inequalities. The continental European countries have 
strong Catholic parties that after World War II, when faced with the threat of Communism, 
became committed to providing security for the population through a corporatist social structure 
(Lindert 2004). The English speaking countries have a strong 19th century liberal belief in limited 
government (Kamerman and Kahn 1978; Esping-Andersen 1990; Hollingsworth, Schmitter, and 
Streeck 1994; Gornick and Meyers 2003; Huber and Stephens 1999).  
If the gross value of cash transfers is adjusted to take account of income taxes on the 
transfers and the level of indirect (sales and value added) taxes, the differences across countries 
in social welfare expenditures shrinks considerably as seen in the second bar for each country in 
Figure 1. It is apparent that the Scandinavian and continental European countries are more likely 
to tax cash transfers and to finance social welfare expenditures through indirect taxes than the 
English speaking countries, and hence it is important to capture their effects as well as those of 
direct (payroll and income) taxes. 
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And, among the English speaking countries, the United States relies least on indirect 
taxes and is also least in taxing cash transfers under its income tax. Sweden still spends the most 
and the English speaking countries the least for either gross or net benefits, but when the more 
appropriate net expenditures measure is used instead of gross expenditures, the ratio of Swedish 
to United States expenditures declines substantially―from about 1.5 to about 1.2.  
Figure 2 displays the two major domains of welfare state expenditures: cash and non cash 
(health and education) spending. When noncash spending, especially for health and education is 
compared to net cash spending, the enormous size of these benefits becomes apparent. Noncash 
spending is larger than net cash spending in several countries, including those diverse as the 
United States, Canada, Finland, and Sweden. It is about the same size as are net cash benefits in 
several others. 
In most countries the biggest single source of welfare state expenditures is for cash social 
retirement benefits including employer provided pensions. The second biggest expenditure is on 
health care. Spending on education and cash transfers other than retirement pensions are the third 
and fourth largest components in all countries.7 In view of the large size of health and education 
expenditures (and to a lesser extent, other in-kind benefits) studies that take account of only cash 
transfers are omitting very large components of what the welfare state does. In particular, the 
Anglo Saxon nations, and particularly the United States, spend relatively more on gross non cash 
benefits than do the other nations. Indeed in the United States, non cash spending for health and 
education outweigh both gross and net cash benefits in absolute terms. 
The United States also spends far less than all of the other countries on cash transfers 
other than pensions, including all non elderly cash transfer programs such as disability, 
unemployment, family leave (Garfinkel, Rainwater and Smeeding 2004). The pattern is similar 
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for “other in-kind” benefits―rental housing benefits, family services, services for the elderly or 
disabled, child nutrition―with the United States being on the low side. Finally, social spending 
on housing is very small everywhere. At 2 percent, the United Kingdom is the biggest spender. 
France, which spends only half that amount, is the next most generous.  
There are a few other aspects of the nature of the American and more generally the 
English speaking welfare state(s) that stand out and merit comment. The most striking feature of 
American social expenditures, compared with other industrialized countries, is how much more 
is spent on health care (Appendix Table A-1). 8 Indeed, more than a third of United States social 
expenditures are spent on health! The main reason the United States differs from others is that 
we pay much higher prices for health care than do other nations. Anderson et al. (2003) suggests 
that the United States is below the OECD median in terms of health service use, but with total 
health care spending per capita ($4,631 in 2000 dollars) that is more than twice the OECD 
median ($1,983). This suggests that Americans pay more but receive fewer health care services 
in return than do people in most OECD nations. 
The United States, which was a pioneer in free public education in the first half of the 
19th century and led the expansion of secondary and higher mass education throughout most of 
the 20th century in this area (Heidenheimer and Layson 1982; Lindert 2004), but is no longer in 
the lead. A primary reason for this is that the United States lags behind the Scandinavian 
countries, France, Belgium and the United Kingdom in expenditures on early childhood 
education programs. Appendix Table 1-B shows that the United States spends only $303 per 
household with children on ECE, least of all nations, save Australia. Canada is the closest nation 
with $389 per child.  
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Though we do not attempt to estimate the effects of other in-kind benefits, we make a 
first attempt at incorporating in-kind benefits into the comparative analysis of welfare states by 
taking account of health and education expenditures in our estimates of how the welfare state 
affects resources and opportunities. Another comparison point that we cannot take account of is 
user charges for social goods (see also endnote 7). The United States spends the most on health 
care overall, but also has the largest level of charges as a percent of person’s income. When 
consumer expenditure surveys for the aged are compared, United States elder residents pay about 
12 percent of their incomes for out of pocket health care charges (insurance premiums and co-
pays); Canadian, British and French elders pay 5 percent of incomes or less (Smeeding, 2003). 
We have no evidence on out of pocket spending for schooling, though we suspect that the United 
States ranks high on this ground as well.  
Although welfare state expenditures relative to GDP is a good indicator of the degree to 
which countries differ in the proportions of their incomes devoted to the welfare state, such 
differences are not a good indication of the absolute amounts of expenditures devoted to welfare 
state expenditures. For example, though Sweden devotes over 40 percent of GDP to welfare state 
expenditures, compared to the United States proportion of 25 percent, Sweden’s GDP per capita 
is only 70 percent of the United States GDP per capita. Consequently, in absolute terms, the 
United States spends a lot more than 25/40 of what Sweden spends on a per capita basis. 
Therefore, to compare absolute levels of expenditures across countries, we multiply the 
proportions of GDP devoted to social welfare expenditures in every nation (Figure 1) by the ratio 
of its GDP to the United States GDP. The results, presented in Figure 3, indicate that real per 
capita social welfare expenditures in the United States are substantially larger than expenditures 
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in the other three English speaking nations. Indeed, except for Sweden, United States 
expenditures are larger than those in all other countries.  
 
IV. The Redistributive Effects of Expenditures and Taxes  
Having established that there are small but potentially significant differences in the size 
and nature of the English speaking welfare states, and even larger differences between the 
English speaking and continental West European and Scandinavian countries, we investigate 
next the degree to which these differences affect the distribution of resources within countries. 
As explained above, we examine only a subset of the social welfare benefits displayed in Figure 
1. In particular, public housing and some other in-kind benefits, like higher education benefits, 
are omitted from the analyses below.  
Table 1 panels A-D display the mean net benefits by full income quintile: health, 
education, and cash social welfare expenditures, minus taxes, as a percent of equivalent full 
income by household quintiles for all households with children. The term equivalent is designed 
to remind the reader that household income is divided by the square root of household size.  
For the entire population, taxes levied equal total benefits, including benefits for the aged 
as well as children. Table 1, panel A displays the results for all persons and so net benefits are 
zero in the right hand column. The 80.4 percent figure in the first column of the first row, for 
example, indicates that in Australia, the average person in the 1st quintile of full income receives 
net benefits equal to over 4 times their family’s market income, or that net transfer benefits are 
80.4 percent of full income in that quintile. Similarly, the -30.5 percent figure in the next to last 
column of the first row indicates that in Australia, the average person in the fifth quintile loses 
nearly 30.5 percent of full income as a net result of welfare state transfers and taxes. 
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Several findings stand out from the top panel of the table. First, in all of the countries, 
welfare state benefits, net of taxes, substantially and systematically redistribute resources away 
from the top towards the bottom of the income distribution. The redistributional effects of net 
social welfare transfers have the same pro-poor pattern in all nations, differing only by degree, 
not direction. The middle quintile is always a net beneficiary, on average taxes paid are less than 
and benefits received by 11 percent here. The fourth quintile pays taxes which average a modest 
6 percent of full incomes. The majority of the net costs of supporting the welfare state are paid 
by the top income persons in each nation, even after we account for indirect taxes. 
Second, the increase in resources available to persons in the bottom full income quintile 
is very large. That, on average, 53 percent of full income is net transfers indicates that welfare 
states more than doubles market incomes in this quintile. The increases are large because the 
bottom quintile in all countries consists primarily of elderly and single mothers who have no or 
very low market earnings and high social welfare benefits.  
Third, in all countries the taxes required to finance welfare state benefits take away a 
non-trivial proportion of resources from families in the top quintile—on average 23 percent of 
full income, and ranging from 16 percent to 31 percent. Finland, the United States, France and 
the Netherlands take away the least. Perhaps the most surprising finding in the table is that the 
Finland takes away least and Australia, Belgium and United Kingdom the most from the top 
quintile. The difference between France and Belgium or France and the Netherlands, is also 
surprising. Private pensions in the United States and Finland affect these ratios and also in 
Netherlands (see discussion following).  
The figures for families with children, elderly, and non-elderly without children are 
contained in panels B, C, and D. The pattern of redistribution for children looks much like the 
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pattern for all persons—progressive redistribution up the income scale with the top quintile being 
net taxpayers in all nations--with net taxes of 19.2 percent of full income. The last column of the 
table is of the most interest and indicates that in most countries families with children receive in 
benefits about what they pay in taxes. Though the variations are not extremely large (compared 
for example to the transfers to the aged discussed below) the differences across countries are 
interesting. Families with children in Belgium and France are net taxpayers—that is taxes exceed 
full incomes by over 10 percent in each while such families in Finland, the United Kingdom and 
the United States are surprisingly net gainers. In fact, Unites States children are net gainers at 
least until the 80th percentile, the highest of any nation. This is because of relatively higher 
United States education benefits and health benefits. That French children are net taxpayers, 
despite the relative generosity of the French towards children (Bergman 1997), suggests that 
there must be a lot of social support for other groups in France. 
Elders, as panel C indicates, are everywhere net beneficiaries of the welfare state and this 
is nowhere more truely so than in France. Here elders are net transfer recipients to the tune of 
over 80 percent of their net incomes! Across all nations, elders average 54.8 percent of their final 
full incomes in net transfers. Benefits are least in the nations with the strongest occupational 
(private) pension schemes: Finland, and the United States and The Netherlands. They are largest 
where public pensions are large—France Belgium, Sweden and Germany. In the other cases, 
strong welfare state benefits and private pensions lead to a middle case (Netherlands, Canada and 
the United Kingdom). These amazing results suggest that the welfare state, as currently operating 
in all the rich nations examined here, provides a very large net transfer to the aged. Changing 
demographics, rapidly escalating health care costs, and stubborn patterns of early retirement 
suggest serious fiscal problems for each of these nations over coming decades. Either benefits 
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must be curtailed (e.g., by increasing retirement ages ), or the elderly must be more heavily taxed 
or charged for public services, especially health care, or taxes on the rest of the population must 
be increased.  
Of course, someone must be paying the bill for these benefits and not just families with 
children. Still we suspect that net benefits to families with children are higher than one might 
expect because the social retirement system in the United States is somewhat offset by private 
pensions and employer provided health care. Were the parents of children in the United Sates 
subject to payroll taxes at French, Belgian or Swedish levels to cover a full-blown public health 
insurance or social retirement scheme, their net benefits would be much smaller in Table 1, 
panel B. 
Indeed, panel D of Table 1 indicates that the childless are net taxpayers in all societies, 
averaging 21.9 percent in net taxes. The second quintile is the average tipping point, where 
benefits just equal taxes. Above this level the top three quintiles exhibit net taxes in every nation.  
In sum, welfare states are large engines of redistribution. The bottom three quintiles and 
elders are net beneficiaries in all societies. The richest fifth of the population and the non-elderly 
childless pays for the bulk of net transfers. 
 
V. Relative Well-Being within Countries  
 
 To replicate prior research and to tie this analysis to earlier work on income distribution, 
we begin our analyses with cash disposable income, which adds to market income cash and near-
cash (those denominated in dollars like Food Stamps in the US and cash housing allowances in 
Sweden) transfers and subtracts direct taxes. Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7 present data on the 
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distribution of cash disposable incomes, and then full incomes for all persons, households with 
children, the elderly and childless adults. The first column presents the ratio of incomes of the 
person (child, elder, childless adult) at the 10th percentile compared to the income of the person 
(child, elder, childless adult) at the median. For the sub-group analyses of children, elders, 
childless non elderly adults, each group is shown relative to the group’s distribution in each 
nation. 
At 39, the United States has the lowest ratio of low to middle incomes (P10/P50) in panel 
A of Figure 4. The ratios for the other English speaking nations range from 45 to 47. The 
continental European nations have ratios in the low to mid 50’s and the two Scandinavian 
nations have ratios of 57. Similarly, the ratio of the 90th to the 50th percentile are generally 
highest in the English speaking countries and lowest in the Scandinavian countries, with the 
United States and United Kingdom having the greatest distance between the median and upper-
income person. Finally, the economic distance between the person at the 10th percentile and the 
person at the 90th percentile—our measure of an equal opportunity for children and equality of 
provision for others—is greatest in the United States, with the person at the 90th percentile 
having 5.43 times the income of the person at the 10th percentile. The other English speaking 
nations have ratios of 3.99 or greater; the continental nations have ratios in the mid to low 3’s; 
and the Scandinavian countries have ratios in the high 2’s. These patterns conform to previous 
LIS research (Rainwater and Smeeding 2003; Smeeding 2004a). 
Panel B of Figure 4 presents data on the distribution of after tax, after transfer full 
incomes in our ten nations. Taking account of non-cash transfers and the indirect as well as 
direct taxes required to finance those changes the results substantially. The 10/50 ratio rises in all 
countries and, except for Finland; the distance between the poor and the rich shrinks in all 
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countries (except Finland which was already very equal). Changes are largest among the English 
speaking nations. Here, though the United States still has the largest 90/10 ratio, it has fallen by 
large amount from 5.43 to 3.65. Large declines are also found in Australia and the United 
Kingdom and even in Canada. The largest changes are in the 10/50 ratios, especially for the 
United States. And while the English speaking nations still have the lowest 10/50 ratios, and the 
Scandinavian countries the highest, the differences between these groups have shrunk 
considerably. The differences in the 10/50 and 90/10 ratios between the least and most unequal 
countries—the United States and Sweden—shrink as well. In fact, the 10/50 ratios are now in a 
tight band, with P10’s only varying from 52 to 58 percent of the median. The range and distances 
at the top (90/50) also drop, but difference between the United Kingdom and the United States 
compared to the others remain large.  
Why do the results change so dramatically when we include the value of the in-kind 
education and health benefits and take account of the taxes required to finance these benefits? 
There are two reasons, both already discussed. First, as seen in Figure 1, compared to other 
advanced industrialized nations, the United States is short on cash and long on in-kind benefits. 
Second, as seen in Figure 3, the big spending welfare states rely more heavily on indirect taxes 
and taxation of cash benefits than the United States. Together, these two factors explain the big 
shift when we go from cash disposable income to full income. And similar patterns are found in 
other English speaking nations. Indeed, one can argue that health and education benefits are a 
substitute for cash in these nations, more so than in the European and Scandinavian nations 
which spend large amounts on both cash and non-cash benefits.  
The point becomes even clearer by a quick perusal of Table 2, which provides data on 
mean welfare state benefits for families with children in our ten countries. These benefits are per 
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household—i.e., not equivalized or per person. Whereas the United States provides the lowest 
fraction of cash benefits to households of all countries, it provides far and away the highest 
values of education and health benefits of all countries and therefore, the highest total benefits. 
While we provide on average 29 percent of benefits in cash, we provide the rest—71 percent—in 
health and education (with health a full 46 percent all by itself). In other nations, average cash 
benefits are much higher as a percent of total benefits, while non-cash benefits, especially health 
benefits are much lower. For kids, education spending makes up between 40 and 48 percent of 
total benefits in every nation. For elders and childless, the contrast is just between health and 
cash, with both being very high. Health for the elderly exceeds cash only in Finland; it is closer 
(45 percent) in the United States and much lower elsewhere. Overall children in the United 
States and elders each receive gross benefits of about $23,980. Non elders without kids get 
$8413, about $21,000 less. Once taxes are counted, it is clear that we redistribute to the old and 
the young, and owing to the low market incomes of elders, they are the largest net beneficiaries. 
The parents of children pay more in taxes than do the aged. Similar patterns across age groups 
are found in each nation, though none are so pronounced as in the United States. For those of us 
who are used to believing that the absolute size of the United States welfare system is small, total 
welfare state benefits per household―$17,276 (or $23,980 for kids and elders)―is staggering 
once one includes health and education spending.9 We are pikers in cash, but big spenders in the 
later two categories. But we are also richer as the relative analyses below show  
Figures 5-7 show the patterns of redistribution for the three subgroups. Children’s P10 is 
low in the United States relative to other children—39—but rising to 58 once non cash benefits 
are counted. Still the United States is below average for kids (61) and is second to Canada which 
has only a 10/50 ratio of 54; but the United States is much closer to the others on a full income 
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basis than on a cash disposable income basis. Decile ratios for kids fall even more in the United 
States than did the overall decile ratios—from 5.24 in cash, to 3.14 after education and health 
care are counted. Both of these benefits appear crucial to child well being and equality of 
opportunity in every nation.  
Similar equalization is found among the elders (though the United States’ 90/10 ratio still 
remains far above all others) in Figure 6. On a full income basis and average the P10 for elders 
exceeds that for children in every nation except the United States where both are at 58.But here 
the US elders are still the lowest among all nations studied, much closer to the median than on a 
cash only basis, but still with P10’s far below the overall average of 66. United States well to do 
elders continue to be far above other elders in relative terms, owing a mainly the high levels of 
US health care subsidies. Non elderly adults without kids are the least well off group in all 
countries at the P10, owing to the fact that they receive less net benefits and that their 
comparison distribution is filled with single persons who do not earn much at all.  
Panel C in Figures 4-7 imputes the all country average of each benefit within each group. 
That is comparisons between panel B ( Actual Benefit FI) and panel C ( Average benefit FI) 
suggest the degree to which difference between DPI (Panel A) and adding non-cash benefits are 
driven by either the inclusion of in-kind benefits at all (panel C) or the specific value of non-cash 
benefits in each nation( Panel B). Indeed for children the results are that non-cash benefits makes 
a difference however valued, but for elders, the value of health care benefits can make a large 
degree of difference all by themselves. We discuss these differences more fully below in the 
sensitivity section and in Table 3. 
 Non cash benefits are doing much to limit the variance across nations. Indeed in an 
earlier, but less complete article on this topic looking at many of these same nations in the early 
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1980’s. Coder, et al.(1993) found that inclusion of health care and education subsides valued at 
government cost lessened inequality among countries, but did not produce much if any change 
country inequality ranking. This is still the case with the estimates presented here (see Appendix 
Table 3) though the decile ratios are much closer now because indirect taxes are counted here 
(and not in w the 1993 article), but mainly because non cash benefit values for health and 
education have grown much faster than cash income over the past two decades. 
Finally, no value of P10 in Panel B of Figures 4-7 lies below 50 percent. By definition 
then, a relative poverty definition based on FI which sets the poverty line at 50 percent of the 
median for each group would result in poverty rates below 10 percent for children and for the 
elderly in each and every elder nation. These results are far from those found based on cash 
income alone. Clearly, we must take a closer look at the way that we measure and value non cash 
health and education benefits. 
Sensitivity of Results to Valuations of in-kind benefits 
The results in Panels A and B in Figures 4-7, may be sensitive to a number of 
assumptions underlying the simulations, including: 1) non-cash benefits are the same value for 
rich and poor and 2) cross national differences in expenditures on health and education measure 
real differences in quantity of services. With respect to the first assumption, for the United 
States, for example, we take some account of differences in spending for health (public vs. 
employer vs. uninsured). We take no account for children’s education. If school spending 
(relative to children’s needs) is lower for low-income children compared to high-income 
children, the result might be somewhat different. Card and Payne (1998), Wilson (2000), and 
Duncombe and Yinger (1997) find that public school spending in the United States may differ by 
up to 50 percent between rich and poor districts. Wilson, Lambright and Smeeding (2004) find 
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that while per student benefits differ across the parental income distribution by only about 10 
percent, when corrected for differences in needs due to poverty, disability and English as a 
second language, benefits for top quintile children are 25 to 30 percent larger than for poor 
children. If poor children received education benefits of only two thirds to half those received by 
rich children, the results for the United States children would be much closer to the results shown 
for cash alone (Panel A vs. Panel B in Figure 5). But, expenditures on schooling may differ by 
income class in other countries besides the United States and we have no evidence of by how 
much.  
The valuation of in-kind benefits is particularly knotty in cross-national research. As we 
have seen, the United States spends substantially more on education and health than all other 
nations. In large, part the differences in health care are attributable to higher relative and absolute 
salaries of doctors, nurses, and other personnel in the United States (Anderson et al. 2003). It is 
hard to believe that the differences in expenditures for health care translate dollar for dollar into 
differences in the quantity and quality of services received. One simple way to address this issue 
empirically is to assume that the quantity and quality of education and health services is the same 
across nations. Thus, we simulated equal benefits of education and health across nations, using 
the mean benefit across nations, but preserving the difference in financing costs in Panel C of 
Figures 4 -7. This has the effect of discounting the value of United States health and education 
benefits. In a second simulation, we used estimates of purchasing power parity (PPP) to estimate 
adjusted health care expenditures where the quantity of care is controlled for. This adjustment 
reduces differences across nations, but does not eliminate them. We do not report the results of 
the PPP simulations because they are virtually identical to the full income results10. The results 
for equal benefit value across all nations’ scenario, however, are quite different from the full 
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income results and are present in panel C in tables 4-7 and summarize the differences for the 
United States alone in Table 3. Indeed, for the populations as a whole the equal benefit value 
across all nation results are somewhat closer to the disposable income than to the full income 
results. This is especially true at the top of the distribution, where the US 90/10 ratio is 1.84 
times that for Sweden for disposable income, 1.36 for full income, and 1.67 for full income with 
equal benefit value across nations.  
For families with children (Figure 5), the equal benefit results are closer to the full 
benefits simulation, indicating that no matter how we value in kind benefits for children, 
counting them makes a large difference in relative resources across all nations and especially for 
United States children. Under all scenarios examined for families with children, taking account 
of health and education expenditures substantially reduces differences among nations in general 
and improves the position of United States in particular. The remaining differences between the 
English speaking, continental, and Scandinavian countries are large enough to make us confident 
that they are real. But, among the English speaking nations, the differences are small enough 
relative to our knowledge regarding distributions of expenditures and the appropriate valuation 
of expenditures to give us pause.  
For elders (Figure 6), however, the equal benefit results are much closer to the disposable 
income results. Indeed, the P10 ratios for disposable income and equal value benefits simulations 
in the US for the elderly are virtually identical (see summary Table 3 for all US figures). 
Moreover, these results for the elderly clearly prompt the question, is the US getting its money 
worth the vastly disproportionate amount of resources we are devoting to health care 
expenditures for this group? 
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The sensitivity of our results also points to the need to undertake research on differences 
in expenditures on health and education within countries by income class (as in Wilson, 
Lambright, and Smeeding 2004). But there are other conceptual problems. Even if the 
expenditures were equal across income classes, the value of benefits might differ by income 
class. For example, per pupil expenditures in some inner city American schools are equal to and, 
in some cases, higher than expenditures in their suburban counterparts. But the inner city schools 
have inferior physical plants, inferior teachers, more difficult to educate students, and more 
disciplinary problems resulting in unequal learning opportunities (Phillips and Chen 2003). 
Similarly, the quality of health care varies substantially within cities where Medicaid financed 
low-income clinics and public hospitals deal with different populations than do their suburban 
counterparts. It is not clear how to address these issues empirically. 
More generally, it is not clear that expenditures should be valued at government cost. 
Economists generally assume that in-kind benefits are worth less to recipients than the cash 
equivalent value would be. These differences are liable to be the largest where the ratio of in-
kind to cash income is the largest, among poor families. Since the 10/50 ratio for low-income 
persons rises from 39 to 53 percent for all persons (Figure 4), while that children rises by almost 
50 percent (from 39 to 58 in Figure 5) and for elders by almost as much (from 42 to 58), once 
these benefits are added in, the differences between market value (government cost) and 
recipient value are liable to be largest for low-income families. And because high-income units 
are net taxpayers and are also more mobile than are low-income families, one should assume that 
the high-income family values education and health benefits closer to their market value 
(government cost).  
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In a final sensitivity analysis therefore, we both discount in-kind benefits in general and 
discount them more for lower income groups. Following Smeeding (1982) we discount health 
benefits care benefits by 20 percent for the top quintile, 30percent for the 2nd, 4percent for the 
3rd, 55 percent for the next to bottom quintile and 65 percent for the poorest quintile. Although 
there are not estimated cash equivalent values of education, we discount education benefits by 
10, 25, 40, 45, and 50 percent, respectively, for the five quintiles. The results, reported in Table 4 
and Figure 8 panel C, indicate that the cash equivalent values, like the equal country benefit 
value results, are much closer to the disposable income results than to the actual full income 
results.  
On the other hand, it could be argued that we have underestimated the value to children 
of the in-kind benefits because though education is targeted exclusively at children, we add the 
value of education to household disposable income and then divide by the square of household 
size to obtain equivalent income per child. Arguably, it would be more appropriate to add the 
value of education per child to equivalent disposable income. Doing so would give more even 
more weight to the in-kind benefits. Future research should examine the sensitivity of results to 
all of these variations. Similarly, our valuations take no account of the external benefits of 
education. 
 
VI. Summary and Conclusion 
This paper estimates the redistributive effects of welfare state expenditures on disparities 
in the economic well-being of in ten nations. Data on cash and non-cash social welfare benefits 
are used to describe differences in the size and nature of welfare states. We combined aggregate 
OECD data on social welfare expenditures with micro data on households from the Luxembourg 
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Income Study (LIS) to estimate the redistributive effects of the expenditures and to construct 
measures of the differences in the relative standard of living at various points in the income 
distributions of their countries.  
Similar to previous research, we find that the English speaking nations devote less of 
their GDP to social welfare spending than do the continental European and Scandinavian nations. 
Differences among the English speaking nations are smaller than the differences between the 
English speaking and other nations. Among the English speaking nations, the United States ranks 
last if employer provided health benefits are not counted, but second, just below the United 
Kingdom, if employer provided health insurance benefits are counted. But differences between 
countries are substantially narrower for net social welfare expenditures than for gross social 
welfare expenditures. Because the United States GDP is so much higher than the GDP of the 
other nations, however, per capita social welfare expenditures in the United States are the highest 
and substantially higher than levels in all other English speaking nations. Finally, the aggregates 
in Figures 1-3 suggest that the United States spends much less on cash and near-cash assistance 
than other countries and as much or more on education and health.  
In all nations, the redistributive effects of social welfare expenditures are large—both in 
raising the level of resources at the bottom and reducing levels of resources at the top. The aged 
are clearly the largest net beneficiaries of the fisc. In every nation and at every income level, 
benefits exceed taxes for this group. And rising health care costs with low fertility and rapidly 
aging populations have properly rung a danger bell regarding future costs of aging societies in 
every one of these nations. There should be additional pressure in these countries to have the 
elders—especially those who are well off—assume more of their own fiscal responsibility for 
health care and retirement needs in old age. 
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In general, the English speaking nations raise the bottom for children the most because 
such a large proportion of children at the bottom are cared for by a non-working single mother 
and because these nations are relatively less generous with cash benefits for children or their 
parents. The bottom for the aged are raised by health and social retirement pensions, and the least 
impacts are where there are substantial private pension systems (Finland, United States and the 
Netherlands). 
In each nation, non-elders in the top fifth of the income distribution and especially 
childless adults are the ones paying the majority of the taxes to finance these benefits. Some 
might be forever childless, others may have grown children no longer living with them. But in 
any case, while they are childless, they pay more in taxes than they get in benefits in any and all 
rich nations.  
Similar to previous research, we also find that poor children in English speaking nations 
are relatively worse off than their continental European and, especially, their Scandinavian 
counterparts. These rankings remain even after taking account of in-kind benefits and the taxes 
required to finance them, but the differences are narrowed substantially When cash disposable 
income is the metric, the difference between the 10/50 ratio in Sweden and the United States is 
nearly 2 to 1 and the difference in the 90/10 ratio is more than 2 to 1. These differences shrink by 
at least half when health and education benefits are valued at cost and added to cash incomes net 
of the taxes used to finance these benefits. The results for the aged are far more sensitive to the 
valuation of health care benefits. 
How to value in-kind benefits is problematic both conceptually and empirically 
(Smeeding 1982). In this paper, we have taken only a first stab at the problem. But, conceptually 
it is clear that these benefits are worth some nontrivial amount to both rich and poor alike. They 
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are also likely worth something to the childless that pay for them, especially in an 
intergenerational or intertemporal framework. Empirically, health and education are as large as 
or a much larger part of what the welfare state does for families than are the provision of cash 
benefits in all nations. We need to realize this fact as we consider the relative effectiveness and 
generosity of all welfare states, most especially the United States. 
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Endnotes 
 
 
1.  Our imputations do not include tax expenditures; they do include tax related refundable 
credits such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the United States and the Family 
Tax Benefit in the United Kingdom. 
 
2. We assume that employer payroll taxes and employer provided health insurance in the 
United States are taken from wages that employers would otherwise pay. Thus, the 
“incidence” is on labor and to calculate income gross of benefits, we added these to 
market income. Direct taxes―personal income and employee payroll taxes―were 
allocated to the households and workers paid for them. Corporate taxes and value added 
taxes were assumed to be shifted to the consumer and were allocated according to total 
consumption (see text). Property taxes are assumed to fall on owners and renters and 
were distributed in proportion to housing consumption. 
 
3. OECD data on early childhood education are by their own admission incomplete and 
inaccurate. Sources provided by Gornick and Meyers (2003) were more complete and 
consistent, except for subsidized child care for children under age three, where data is 
even less complete. Consequently, we omitted child care for children under age three. 
 
4.  Ordering of mixed cases was as follows Elders (persons 65 and older) with children are 
counted among families with children (age under 18); elders are only elders without kids. 
The remainder has neither elders nor kids and are the childless non aged. 
 
5. Tax expenditures for housing are not counted.  
 
6.  The distribution of expenditures varies systematically with their provider. If tax 
expenditures and employers subsidize ‘social’ spending, the distribution of these benefits 
will be much more pro-rich than if the distribution is subsidized by governments directly. 
 
7. These differences and the ones discussed in the next paragraph are not shown here but are 
available from the authors, or in Garfinkel, Rainwater, and Smeeding 2004. 
 
8. This public and employer subsidized figures in Appendix Table 1-A understate how 
much more Americans spend on health than do citizens of other countries because 
private, out of pocket, health expenditures, which are quite substantial in the United 
States—another 2 percent of GDP—are not reflected in the table. 
 
9. The average benefit simulations and their distributions are shown in Appendix Table 2. 
 
10. In a second simulation for children, we used estimates of purchasing power parity (PPP) 
to estimate adjusted health care expenditures where the quantity of care is controlled for. 
This adjustment reduces differences across nations, but does not eliminate them. For 
more, see Garfinkel, Rainwater and Smeeding (2004). 
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Country Year LOW 2 3 4 HIGH TOTAL
Australia 1994 80.4 51.9 9.1 -10.1 -30.5 0.0
Canada 1997 51.2 36.6 9.4 -6.0 -22.7 0.0
United Kingdom 1999 70.6 51.0 19.7 -10.1 -28.6 0.0
United States 2000 33.6 24.5 10.9 -2.0 -16.1 0.0
Belgium 1997 68.3 49.2 13.1 -10.2 -29.1 0.0
France 1994 18.6 16.0 13.9 0.9 -16.3 0.0
Germany 2000 54.6 35.4 12.9 -7.3 -24.8 0.0
Netherlands 1999 42.5 27.8 3.5 -8.3 -17.5 0.0
Finland 2000 53.8 25.4 5.0 -5.3 -15.7 0.0
Sweden 2000 56.8 32.1 12.2 -2.9 -24.0 0.0
Average2 53.0 35.0 11.0 -6.1 -22.5 0.0
Australia 1994 71.9 30.8 7.1 -3.9 -25.0 3.5
Canada 1997 50.7 23.4 6.0 -4.6 -18.9 1.3
United Kingdom 1999 65.6 39.9 18.7 -3.4 -19.9 6.2
United States 2000 33.6 26.4 14.3 3.9 -11.3 5.2
Belgium 1997 44.9 9.4 -6.3 -18.8 -32.9 -10.5
France 1994 1.2 2.4 1.9 -8.5 -27.0 -10.2
Germany 2000 37.9 11.3 0.2 -6.9 -17.3 -1.9
Netherlands 1999 34.7 8.6 5.7 -0.5 -10.5 2.4
Finland 2000 47.1 22.5 9.5 -1.0 -8.7 6.7
Sweden 2000 34.3 11.7 2.7 -5.1 -20.2 -2.1
Average2 42.2 18.6 6.0 -4.9 -19.2 0.1
Australia 1994 92.6 93.6 88.1 63.5 6.7 52.0
Canada 1997 93.5 85.5 71.0 50.3 16.6 49.9
United Kingdom 1999 90.2 86.3 77.5 60.8 17.0 53.1
United States 2000 63.0 65.0 55.6 40.9 10.8 34.8
Belgium 1997 93.9 96.1 89.2 74.3 46.1 70.7
France 1994 93.0 87.7 84.9 81.6 70.9 80.1
Germany 2000 88.8 86.6 82.3 71.5 37.3 65.3
Netherlands 1999 90.2 83.2 66.7 44.3 20.6 50.7
Finland 2000 66.1 41.9 31.4 15.5 1.5 20.7
Sweden 2000 95.6 90.6 86.1 77.6 43.3 70.3
Average2 86.7 81.7 73.3 58.0 27.1 54.8
Australia 1994 70.6 13.6 -15.5 -24.8 -36.3 -17.4
Canada 1997 34.5 3.4 -13.6 -20.9 -31.3 -17.6
United Kingdom 1999 51.3 6.0 -22.9 -34.6 -37.2 -23.6
United States 2000 11.4 -8.0 -15.4 -19.7 -25.4 -18.2
Belgium 1997 54.5 12.7 -16.2 -30.9 -45.3 -22.5
France 1994 -24.8 -23.3 -21.2 -23.7 -36.8 -28.7
Germany 2000 44.7 0.1 -27.4 -39.5 -42.6 -28.2
Netherlands 1999 21.9 -5.0 -20.2 -31.2 -28.6 -20.7
Finland 2000 51.2 9.7 -12.2 -20.4 -24.3 -12.3
Sweden 2000 37.8 -8.9 -32.1 -42.4 -42.4 -29.6
Average2 35.3 0.0 -19.7 -28.8 -35.0 -21.9
C. Elder Households
Table 1. Net Benefits as a Percent of Full Income by Quintiles of Two Measures of Full Income 1
A. All Persons
B. Childed Households
2Simple average.
D. Childless Households
Source: Authors' calculations from the Luxembourg Income Study.
Notes: 1This table uses the difference between taxes paid and total benefits received as a percent of "final" or 
"full" income.
Country Year All Benefits Education Health Education Health
Australia 1994 $8,648 $3,787 $1,787 $3,074 43.8 20.7 35.5
Canada 1997 14,381 6,980 2,912 4,488 48.5 20.2 31.2
United Kingdom 1999 12,050 6,400 2,301 3,350 53.1 19.1 27.8
United States 2000 17,278 5,082 4,213 7,983 29.4 24.4 46.2
Belgium 1997 16,558 10,376 2,268 3,913 62.7 13.7 23.6
France 1994 15,573 9,086 2,586 3,900 58.3 16.6 25.0
Germany 2000 13,945 7,731 1,893 4,321 55.4 13.6 31.0
Netherlands 1999 12,277 6,294 2,426 3,557 51.3 19.8 29.0
Finland 2000 9,122 4,353 2,023 2,746 47.7 22.2 30.1
Sweden 2000 14,676 8,584 2,349 3,744 58.5 16.0 25.5
Australia 1994 $12,681 $3,809 $5,289 $3,583 30.0 41.7 28.3
Canada 1997 18,835 5,510 8,318 5,007 29.3 44.2 26.6
United Kingdom 1999 17,928 6,799 7,591 3,598 37.9 42.3 20.1
United States 2000 23,982 3,372 11,404 9,206 14.1 47.6 38.4
Belgium 1997 18,801 7,122 7,566 4,113 37.9 40.2 21.9
France 1994 17,446 5,631 7,624 4,191 32.3 43.7 24.0
Germany 2000 18,726 5,916 7,910 4,901 31.6 42.2 26.2
Netherlands 1999 16,404 4,392 7,879 4,133 26.8 48.0 25.2
Finland 2000 17,429 7,143 7,032 3,255 41.0 40.3 18.7
Sweden 2000 22,193 9,014 8,774 4,405 40.6 39.5 19.8
Australia 1994 $12,326 $7,621 $0 $4,705 61.8 0.0 38.2
Canada 1997 22,448 15,908 0 6,540 70.9 0.0 29.1
United Kingdom 1999 15,382 10,662 0 4,720 69.3 0.0 30.7
United States 2000 23,981 13,142 0 10,839 54.8 0.0 45.2
Belgium 1997 24,282 18,863 0 5,419 77.7 0.0 22.3
France 1994 23,619 18,160 0 5,459 76.9 0.0 23.1
Germany 2000 21,848 15,550 0 6,298 71.2 0.0 28.8
Netherlands 1999 18,150 12,890 0 5,260 71.0 0.0 29.0
Finland 2000 7,812 3,694 0 4,119 47.3 0.0 52.7
Sweden 2000 21,053 15,229 0 5,824 72.3 0.0 27.7
Australia 1994 $4,318 $2,233 $0 $2,085 51.7 0.0 48.3
Canada 1997 7,497 4,250 0 3,247 56.7 0.0 43.3
United Kingdom 1999 6,103 3,700 0 2,403 60.6 0.0 39.4
United States 2000 8,413 2,746 0 5,668 32.6 0.0 67.4
Belgium 1997 9,967 7,137 0 2,830 71.6 0.0 28.4
France 1994 8,836 6,145 0 2,692 69.5 0.0 30.5
Germany 2000 7,224 4,259 0 2,965 59.0 0.0 41.0
Netherlands 1999 6,965 4,519 0 2,445 64.9 0.0 35.1
Finland 2000 5,145 3,238 0 1,907 62.9 0.0 37.1
Sweden 2000 7,274 4,937 0 2,337 67.9 0.0 32.1
Percent Shares
Cash and Near 
Cash Transfers
Table 2. Distribution of Mean Benefits1
(in real 2000 US PPP dollars)
A. ALL HOUSEHOLDS
Noncash BenefitsCash and Near 
Cash Transfers
Note: 1The values for the average imputations are shown in Appendix Table 2.
B. CHILDED HOUSEHOLDS     
C. ELDER HOUSEHOLDS      
D. CHILDLESS HOUSEHOLDS        
Source: Authors' calculations from the Luxembourg Income Study.
A. ALL
Income Measure US Average US Average US Average
Disposable Cash Income 39 51 210 184 5.43 3.72
plus Actual Benefit Full Income 53 55 193 172 3.65 3.14
plus Average Benefit Full Income 45 54 203 173 4.48 3.20
B. CHILDREN
Income Measure US Average US Average US Average
Disposable Cash Income 39 53 207 173 5.24 3.35
plus Actual Benefit Full Income 58 61 181 160 3.14 2.64
plus Average Benefit Full Income 52 69 191 159 3.66 2.71
C. ELDERS
Income Measure US Average US Average US Average
Disposable Cash Income 42 60 237 194 5.59 3.34
plus Actual Benefit Full Income 58 66 209 178 3.62 2.70
plus Average Benefit Full Income 43 60 246 191 5.77 3.28
D. CHILDLESS
Income Measure US Average US Average US Average
Disposable Cash Income 38 44 197 177 5.22 4.07
plus Actual Benefit Full Income 45 46 198 180 4.39 3.93
plus Average Benefit Full Income 39 45 208 180 5.37 4.01
Source: Figures 4-7.
Note: 1Average value of health and education benefits are the same for all countries!
Table 3. Summary of US in Comparative Perspective
as Check on Fact (Average Benefit FI) vs. Amount (Actual Benefit FI)1
P10 P90 P90/P10
P10 P90 P90/P10
P10 P90 P90/P10
P10 P90 P90/P10
A. ALL
Income Measure P10 P90 P90/P10
Disposable Cash Income 39 210 5.43
plus Actual Full Income 53 193 3.65
plus Cash Equivalent Value FI 44 204 4.63
B. CHILDREN
Income Measure P10 P90 P90/P10
Disposable Cash Income 39 207 5.24
plus Actual Full Income 58 181 3.14
plus Cash Equivalent Value FI 46 192 4.17
C. ELDERS
Income Measure P10 P90 P90/P10
Disposable Cash Income 42 237 5.59
plus Actual Full Income 58 209 3.62
plus Cash Equivalent Value FI 45 235 5.22
Source: Authors' calculations.
Table 4. U.S. in Comparative Perspective
Cash Equivalents: Do They Make a Difference?
Notes: * Ratio of cash equivalent to government cost for health care in 
bottom quintile = .35; at median = .60; in top quintile = .80. (Source: 
Smeeding (1982) p. 67. Ratio of cash equivalent to government cost for 
education in bottom quintile = .50; middle = .60; top = .90. See text for 
additional explanation.
* net data unavailable.
Note: 1Definition: Gross Benefit figures include all welfare state spending on housing, health care, education, pension, family and work related 
benefits and other cash and near cash benefits. Also includes employer-provided pensions, health care and other welfare benefits lived on. Net 
Benefit figures include the net value of benefits after adjustments for the taxing back of cash benefits and for sales and value added taxes. User 
charges are not included.
Figure 1. Gross and Net Social Welfare Expenditures1 in the
U.S. and Other Welfare States
FY 1997
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Figure 2
 Net Cash and In Kind Social Welfare Expenditures1
in the U.S. and Other Welfare States
FY 1997
Note: 1Definition: Net Benefit figures for cash benefits are same definition as Figure 1; In Kind figures include health care, education, 
some housing, and other social services in kind for which gross and net benefits are the same. 
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Note: Gross Benefit figures are same definition as Figure 1; Per capital spending in 2000 US Dollars per capita PPP Terms with US Spending = 1.0.
Figure 3. Per Capita Social Welfare Expenditures
of Other Countries Relative to the United States
FY 1997
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P10/P50 P90/P50 P90/P10
(Low Income) (High Income) (Decile Ratio)
Australia 1994 45 192 4.22
Canada 1997 47 186 3.99
United Kingdom 1999 47 214 4.54
United States 2000 39 210 5.43
Belgium 1997 53 170 3.19
France 1994 54 190 3.53
Germany 2000 54 177 3.29
Netherlands 1999 54 169 3.12
Finland 2000 57 164 2.90
Sweden 2000 57 168 2.95
Average 51 184 3.72
P10/P50 P90/P50 P90/P10
(Low Income) (High Income) (Decile Ratio)
Australia 1994 52 172 3.31
Canada 1997 52 173 3.34
United Kingdom 1999 55 190 3.49
United States 2000 53 193 3.65
Belgium 1997 54 172 3.17
France 1994 57 172 3.00
Germany 2000 57 166 2.93
Netherlands 1999 57 161 2.80
Finland 2000 54 166 3.06
Sweden 2000 58 156 2.69
Average 55 172 3.14
P10/P50 P90/P50 P90/P10
(Low Income) (High Income) (Decile Ratio)
Australia 1994 52 164 3.14
Canada 1997 52 177 3.42
United Kingdom 1999 54 183 3.38
United States 2000 45 203 4.48
Belgium 1997 56 174 3.08
France 1994 57 170 3.01
Germany 2000 57 170 3.01
Netherlands 1999 56 159 2.83
Finland 2000 55 164 2.99
Sweden 2000 60 162 2.69
Average 54 173 3.20
Source: Authors' calculations from the Luxembourg Income Study.
Length of bars represents the gap
between high and low income persons
between high and low income persons
Figure 4. Three Measures of Relative Economic Well-being: ALL PERSONS
(numbers given are percent of all persons' median equivalent income in each nation in each panel)
Economic Distance
Length of bars represents the gap
A. Disposable Personal Income
B. Actual Full Income
Economic Distance
Length of bars represents the gap
between high and low income persons
C. Average Benefit Full Income
Economic Distance
0 50 100 150 200 250
0 50 100 150 200 250
0 50 100 150 200 250
P10/P50 P90/P50 P90/P10
(Low Income) (High Income) (Decile Ratio)
Australia 1994 49 175 3.60
Canada 1997 45 176 3.91
United Kingdom 1999 53 208 3.93
United States 2000 39 207 5.24
Belgium 1997 42 155 2.89
France 1994 45 182 3.23
Germany 2000 45 168 3.00
Netherlands 1999 44 152 2.77
Finland 2000 63 154 2.43
Sweden 2000 63 156 2.47
Average 53 173 3.35
P10/P50 P90/P50 P90/P10
(Low Income) (High Income) (Decile Ratio)
Australia 1994 58 158 2.71
Canada 1997 54 161 2.96
United Kingdom 1999 59 175 2.96
United States 2000 58 181 3.14
Belgium 1997 61 158 2.59
France 1994 63 161 2.57
Germany 2000 62 155 2.52
Netherlands 1999 64 149 2.33
Finland 2000 63 155 2.48
Sweden 2000 68 146 2.15
Average 61 160 2.64
P10/P50 P90/P50 P90/P10
(Low Income) (High Income) (Decile Ratio)
Australia 1994 54 160 2.96
Canada 1997 53 155 2.89
United Kingdom 1999 59 173 2.93
United States 2000 52 191 3.66
Belgium 1997 63 151 2.39
France 1994 62 150 2.40
Germany 2000 62 160 2.59
Netherlands 1999 60 145 2.40
Finland 2000 60 160 2.66
Sweden 2000 64 142 2.22
Average 69 159 2.71
Source: Authors' calculations from the Luxembourg Income Study.
between high and low income children
Figure 5. Three Measures of Relative Economic Well-being: CHILDREN
(numbers given are percent of chilren's median equivalent income in each nation in each panel)
Economic Distance
Length of bars represents the gap
A. Disposable Personal Income
B. Actual Full Income
Economic Distance
Length of bars represents the gap
between high and low income children
C. Average Benefit Full Income
Economic Distance
Length of bars represents the gap
between high and low income children
0 50 100 150 200 250
0 50 100 150 200 250
0 50 100 150 200 250
P10/P50 P90/P50 P90/P10
(Low Income) (High Income) (Decile Ratio)
Australia 1994 55 210 3.85
Canada 1997 66 194 2.94
United Kingdom 1999 56 199 3.54
United States 2000 42 237 5.59
Belgium 1997 62 187 3.01
France 1994 55 200 3.66
Germany 2000 58 177 3.07
Netherlands 1999 70 191 2.71
Finland 2000 68 173 2.53
Sweden 2000 68 172 2.52
Average 60 194 3.34
P10/P50 P90/P50 P90/P10
(Low Income) (High Income) (Decile Ratio)
Australia 1994 64 175 2.71
Canada 1997 69 182 2.64
United Kingdom 1999 69 175 2.77
United States 2000 58 209 3.62
Belgium 1997 67 188 2.80
France 1994 64 181 2.83
Germany 2000 67 162 2.42
Netherlands 1999 76 180 2.36
Finland 2000 68 175 2.58
Sweden 2000 68 156 2.27
Average 66 178 2.70
P10/P50 P90/P50 P90/P10
(Low Income) (High Income) (Decile Ratio)
Australia 1994 57 187 3.28
Canada 1997 65 193 2.99
United Kingdom 1999 54 186 3.42
United States 2000 43 246 5.77
Belgium 1997 69 189 3.00
France 1994 57 195 3.43
Germany 2000 59 176 2.99
Netherlands 1999 72 186 2.57
Finland 2000 63 189 3.00
Sweden 2000 71 169 2.31
Average 60 191 3.28
Source: Authors' calculations from the Luxembourg Income Study.
between high and low income elders
Figure 6. Three Measures of Relative Economic Well-being: ELDERS
(numbers given are percent of elder's median equivalent income in each nation in each panel)
Economic Distance
Length of bars represents the gap
A. Disposable Personal Income
B. Actual Full Income
Economic Distance
Length of bars represents the gap
between high and low income elders
C. Average Benefit Full Income
Economic Distance
Length of bars represents the gap
between high and low income elders
0 50 100 150 200 250
0 50 100 150 200 250
0 50 100 150 200 250
P10/P50 P90/P50 P90/P10
(Low Income) (High Income) (Decile Ratio)
Australia 1994 36 174 4.77
Canada 1997 38 180 4.69
United Kingdom 1999 42 195 4.65
United States 2000 38 197 5.22
Belgium 1997 50 170 3.39
France 1994 49 190 3.86
Germany 2000 48 174 3.63
Netherlands 1999 45 161 3.56
Finland 2000 51 166 3.27
Sweden 2000 46 167 3.66
Average 44 177 4.07
P10/P50 P90/P50 P90/P10
(Low Income) (High Income) (Decile Ratio)
Australia 1994 41 171 4.20
Canada 1997 40 179 4.44
United Kingdom 1999 46 193 4.20
United States 2000 45 198 4.39
Belgium 1997 48 181 3.75
France 1994 52 190 3.69
Germany 2000 49 178 3.64
Netherlands 1999 47 168 3.58
Finland 2000 47 176 3.73
Sweden 2000 46 168 3.63
Average 46 180 3.93
P10/P50 P90/P50 P90/P10
(Low Income) (High Income) (Decile Ratio)
Australia 1994 40 165 4.13
Canada 1997 41 183 4.50
United Kingdom 1999 45 187 4.18
United States 2000 39 208 5.37
Belgium 1997 48 174 3.60
France 1994 52 182 3.50
Germany 2000 49 182 3.75
Netherlands 1999 46 165 3.59
Finland 2000 48 195 4.05
Sweden 2000 47 163 3.44
Average 45 180 4.01
Source: Authors' calculations from the Luxembourg Income Study.
between high and low income childless
Figure 7. Three Measures of Relative Economic Well-being: CHILDLESS PERSONS
(numbers given are percent of childless persons' median equivalent income in each nation in each panel)
Economic Distance
Length of bars represents the gap
A. Disposable Personal Income
B. Actual Full Income
Economic Distance
Length of bars represents the gap
between high and low income childless
C. Average Benefit Full Income
Economic Distance
Length of bars represents the gap
between high and low income childless
0 50 100 150 200 250
0 50 100 150 200 250
0 50 100 150 200 250
P10/P50 P90/P50 P90/P10
(Low Income) (High Income) (Decile Ratio)
Australia 1994 45 192 4.22
Canada 1997 47 186 3.99
United Kingdom 1999 47 214 4.54
United States 2000 39 210 5.43
Belgium 1997 53 170 3.19
France 1994 54 190 3.53
Germany 2000 54 177 3.29
Netherlands 1999 54 169 3.12
Finland 2000 57 164 2.90
Sweden 2000 57 168 2.95
Average 51 184 3.72
P10/P50 P90/P50 P90/P10
(Low Income) (High Income) (Decile Ratio)
Australia 1994 52 172 3.31
Canada 1997 52 173 3.34
United Kingdom 1999 55 190 3.49
United States 2000 53 193 3.65
Belgium 1997 54 172 3.17
France 1994 57 172 3.00
Germany 2000 57 166 2.93
Netherlands 1999 57 161 2.80
Finland 2000 54 166 3.06
Sweden 2000 58 156 2.69
Average 55 172 3.14
P10/P50 P90/P50 P90/P10
(Low Income) (High Income) (Decile Ratio)
Australia 1994 45 184 4.05
Canada 1997 46 184 4.03
United Kingdom 1999 49 204 4.18
United States 2000 43 211 4.86
Belgium 1997 49 182 3.74
France 1994 51 185 3.61
Germany 2000 51 177 3.47
Netherlands 1999 53 172 3.28
Finland 2000 50 173 3.48
Sweden 2000 52 164 3.17
Average 49 184 3.79
Source: Authors' calculations from the Luxembourg Income Study.
Note: * Panels A and B are identical to those in Figure 4.
C. Cash Equivalent Full Income
Economic Distance
Length of bars represents the gap
between high and low income persons
between high and low income persons
Figure 8. Three Measures of Relative Economic Well-being: ALL PERSONS *
(numbers given are percent of all persons' median equivalent income in each nation in each panel)
Economic Distance
Length of bars represents the gap
A. Disposable Personal Income
B. Actual Full Income
Economic Distance
Length of bars represents the gap
between high and low income persons
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Appendix: Technical Imputation Description 
 
We begin with Luxembourg Income Study net after direct tax and cash transfer 
disposable income for ten nations. To this cash and near cash data we add third party health care 
subsidies (public spending in all nations, and employer subsidies in the United States) and 
education subsidies (public sector support for early childhood education (ECE), elementary and 
secondary schooling, but not tertiary schooling or public daycare for children under age three). 
We then subtract direct and indirect taxes, including the LIS direct taxes (income and payroll 
taxes), and also VAT (sales, excise), corporate taxes, and real property taxes. We next rebalance 
total taxes to just equal total expenditures for the entire population. Thus, we exclude taxes paid 
for government final goods and services, and only subtract out taxes to the extent that they equal 
overall benefits paid in each country.  
We use OECD (2003) purchasing power parities to put all non-cash benefits into 2000 
United States PPP adjusted dollars, nationally price indexed to the correct nation year (1997 to 
2000 for all but France and Australia, both 1994). When given OECD or other PPP adjusted 
benefits, we can then convert these to country currency, or vice versa. (For instance, we use both 
ECE data provided by Marcia Meyers (2003), which comes from Danish sources and is in 
national currency, and OECD data in United States dollars.) Given imputed benefits and taxes, 
we then analyze the relative effects of both on the entire population. Here we present only the 
highlights of our imputation schemes and analyses. Additional detail is available from the 
authors. 
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Health Care Benefit 
Health Insurance and third party expenditures on health care are the largest single 
element of non-cash benefit in every major country. We begin with OECD average public 
subsidy per person taken from OECD (2002a). These subsidies are given in Appendix Table 1-A. 
The United States amount is not just public subsidy, but includes two additional amounts: 
employer subsidies, taken from the Employment Benefit Research Institute (2004), and an 
amount for the uninsured (about 15 percent of the United States population) who are receiving 
charity or other public care with a value of half of the amount provided by the public sector. 
Thus, for 2000, these per capita amounts are: $2,005 (public subsidy); $2,535 (employer 
subsidy); $1,002 (uninsured subsidy). From the Current Population Survey (CPS) data which 
underlie LIS we can separate the United States population into those with public subsidy 
(Medicare, Medicaid, other); those with employer provided insurance; and the uninsured (from 
estimates provided by Barbara Wolfe 2002), and assign each person an average subsidy. In every 
other country we just assign public subsidies alone. 
 We then decided to impute the “insurance value” of coverage to each person based on 
their age. That is, we take each national average per capita amount, assign that to 19-34 year 
olds, and from there adjust the insurance subsidy according to a person’s age. The insurance 
value is the amount that an insured person would have to pay in each age category so that the 
third party provider (government, employer, other insurer) would just have enough revenue to 
cover all claims for such persons. The multipliers we used were .75 for persons under age 18; 1.0 
for persons age 19-34; 1.25 for 35-54; 1.75 for 55-64; 3.0 for 65-74; and 4.0 for those 75 and 
over. These age related factors were taken from a paper by Smeeding and Freund (2002) who 
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surveyed the literature on the topic. The same adjusters were used in all countries. We then 
readjusted the individual amounts so that the overall average imputed benefit just equaled the 
OECD overall average subsidy (and OECD, employer and uninsured overall subsidies in the 
United States) in each country. The resulting amounts are shown in column 1 of Appendix Table 
1-A. The amounts ranged from $1,063 in Australia (1994), to $3,715 in the United States (2000). 
Germany, at $2,086, is the closest nation to the United States. These were the “base case” or 
“full benefit” imputed amounts used in the simulation.  
 As a final technique, and to determine the affects of “equal” spending and thus the effect 
of “average” non-cash benefits alone in all nations, we assigned the overall average amount of 
$1,719 (bottom row, Column (1), Appendix Table 1-A) to each and every person in each and 
every one of the ten countries. Again, we used the same age and overall benefit level adjustors to 
impute final amounts. 
Education 
 We used OECD (2002b) data to obtain average primary and secondary public 
expenditure per pupil in each country year (columns 2 and 3 of Appendix Table 1-A). These 
were assigned students according to starting and ending ages of primary and secondary school in 
each nation up to age 18. No account was taken of drop-outs or attending nonpublic schools. 
Each person received the same national average benefit according to OECD estimates. That was 
the easy part. 
 The hard part was determining the level and amount of spending for early childhood 
education (ECE) in each country. OECD (2002a) outlays were at odds with all other available 
data sources. Marcia Meyers (2003) was kind enough to share the data used in here recent book 
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with Janet Gornick (Gornick and Meyers 2003) and to help us update these data. We used 
several sources including the Clearinghouse on International Developments in Child, Youth, and 
Family Policy at Columbia University (http://www.childpolicyintl.org/) and the European Union 
“Eurydice” website (http://www.eurydice.org/). These sources gave us five parameters: (1) 
number of children using ECE benefits in each nation; (2) number receiving full day vs. half day 
benefits; (3) average amount spent per child per day; (4) average number of days attended; and 
(5) total spending in each country. We limited benefits to children aged three or over in the 
survey year; we randomly assigned children each benefit amount; and we integrated benefits in 
each nation with the year they began normal elementary schooling. Full details are available 
from authors. 
These amounts are included in the overall average amount of benefit per child aged 3-18 
in Appendix Table 1-A, columns 3 and 4, bottom row. We also considered a “PPP” type 
adjustment for education based on the average pupil-teacher ratio in each nation. However, the 
overall average and variance were so small that we ignored these differences. Thus, our “PPP-
Quantity Adjusted” benefits for education are the same as those shown in Appendix Table 1-A, 
columns 3 and 4. 
In our third and final simulation we assigned the overall average education benefit for 
elementary, secondary and ECE to each child in each nation. These amounts are, found at the 
bottom of columns 2 and 3 in Appendix Table 1-A. 
Taxes 
 We used OECD data on tax to GDP ratios and on the relative distribution of taxes by 
source for each nation, covering five taxes: personal income, payroll, corporate income, 
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property, and “goods and services” (value added, sales, or excise) taxes. The LIS gives us the 
first two taxes directly (though the amount of employer payroll tax had to be imputed and then 
counted in the tax balancing equations). We assumed the incidence of the corporate tax, and 
goods and services tax, was on the consumer, and thus distributed according to overall 
consumption; the incidence of the property tax was assumed to fall on housing consumption. We 
assigned corporate and “goods and services” taxes (and property taxes) according to LIS 
calculated ratios of overall expenditure (housing expenditure) to income ratios by LIS disposable 
income decile provided by Eva Sierminska and Thesia Garner from their LIS-based consumption 
work (Sierminska and Garner 2002). We then rebalanced all taxes to arrive at the average mix 
across taxes within nations, and to just equal total benefits paid in transfers or subsidies (cash 
and near-cash benefits, education, and health care) in each nation for the aggregate only. Hence, 
benefits just equal taxes in every nation. Again, greater detail is available from the authors upon 
request. 
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Health Care1
Country Year (OECD $/person) Elementary Secondary
Australia 1994 $1,063 $2,810 $4,530
Belgium 1997 1,420 3633 5570
Canada 1997 1,532 5000 5900
Finland 2000 1,276 4136 6079
France 1994 1,398 3222 5761
Germany 2000 2,086 3929 6672
Netherlands 1999 1,461 4162 5670
Sweden 2000 1,866 5879 5973
United Kingdom 1999 1,371 3627 5608
United States 2000 3,175 6912 8537
Overall All Nation 
Average Benefit 
across All Types of 
Beneficiaries
$1,719 $4,331 $6,030 
Appendix Table 1-A. National Health and Education Benefits per Beneficiary for Each 
Country
Education2
Notes: 1Includes OECD public subsidies, plus employer and other third party subsidies.
2Overall Education benefit per beneficiary by type of schooling. Ages of schooling vary by 
country. The average ECE per child ws $4001 for those enrolled full year, full time.
Source: Authors' calculations from the Luxembourg Income Study.
Country Year Day Care Elementary Secondary
Australia 1994            38            2,506          2,744 
Canada 1997          389            4,154          3,776 
United Kingdom 1999          470            3,118          3,943 
United States 2000          303            5,302          5,800 
Belgium 1997          767            2,902          3,897 
France 1994       1,091            2,178          4,355 
Germany 2000          498            1,753          5,658 
Netherlands 1999          576            3,537          3,766 
Finland 2000          902            4,297          1,833 
Sweden 2000          773            6,351          1,650 
Average3 581         3,610            3,742          
Note:1These are averaged over all households with children and are not the 
same as spending per beneficiary, which is shown in Appendix Table 1-A.
Appendix Table 1-B. Mean Benefits per Household with Children for 
Three Education Levels1
Source: Authors' calculations from the Luxembourg Income Study.
Country Year All Benefits Education Health Education Health
Australia 1994 $11,300 $3,787 $2,542 $4,971 33.5 22.5 44.0
Canada 1997 14,773 6,980 2,757 5,036 47.2 18.7 34.1
United Kingdom 1999 13,172 6,400 2,572 4,201 48.6 19.5 31.9
United States 2000 11,635 5,082 2,857 3,696 43.7 24.6 31.8
Belgium 1997 17,644 10,376 2,529 4,739 58.8 14.3 26.9
France 1994 16,787 9,086 2,904 4,797 54.1 17.3 28.6
Germany 2000 13,093 7,731 1,801 3,560 59.0 13.8 27.2
Netherlands 1999 13,026 6,294 2,546 4,187 48.3 19.5 32.1
Finland 2000 10,122 4,353 2,070 3,698 43.0 20.5 36.5
Sweden 2000 13,970 8,584 1,938 3,448 61.4 13.9 24.7
Australia 1994 $17,157 $3,809 $7,553 $5,794 22.2 44.0 33.8
Canada 1997 18,982 5,510 7,845 5,618 29.0 41.3 29.6
United Kingdom 1999 19,743 6,799 8,432 4,512 34.4 42.7 22.9
United States 2000 15,356 3,372 7,722 4,262 22.0 50.3 27.8
Belgium 1997 20,550 7,122 8,447 4,981 34.7 41.1 24.2
France 1994 19,363 5,631 8,578 5,154 29.1 44.3 26.6
Germany 2000 17,500 5,916 7,545 4,038 33.8 43.1 23.1
Netherlands 1999 17,521 4,392 8,265 4,864 25.1 47.2 27.8
Finland 2000 18,746 7,143 7,219 4,384 38.1 38.5 23.4
Sweden 2000 20,191 9,014 7,121 4,057 44.6 35.3 20.1
Australia 1994 $15,229 $7,621 $0 $7,607 50.0 0.0 50.0
Canada 1997 23,246 15,908 0 7,338 68.4 0.0 31.6
United Kingdom 1999 16,580 10,662 0 5,918 64.3 0.0 35.7
United States 2000 18,161 13,142 0 5,019 72.4 0.0 27.6
Belgium 1997 25,426 18,863 0 6,563 74.2 0.0 25.8
France 1994 24,874 18,160 0 6,714 73.0 0.0 27.0
Germany 2000 20,739 15,550 0 5,190 75.0 0.0 25.0
Netherlands 1999 19,081 12,890 0 6,191 67.6 0.0 32.4
Finland 2000 9,242 3,694 0 5,548 40.0 0.0 60.0
Sweden 2000 20,593 15,229 0 5,364 74.0 0.0 26.0
Australia 1994 $5,605 $2,233 $0 $3,372 39.8 0.0 60.2
Canada 1997 7,893 4,250 0 3,643 53.8 0.0 46.2
United Kingdom 1999 6,714 3,700 0 3,014 55.1 0.0 44.9
United States 2000 5,370 2,746 0 2,624 51.1 0.0 48.9
Belgium 1997 10,564 7,137 0 3,427 67.6 0.0 32.4
France 1994 9,455 6,145 0 3,311 65.0 0.0 35.0
Germany 2000 6,702 4,259 0 2,443 63.5 0.0 36.5
Netherlands 1999 7,397 4,519 0 2,878 61.1 0.0 38.9
Finland 2000 5,807 3,238 0 2,568 55.8 0.0 44.2
Sweden 2000 7,090 4,937 0 2,152 69.6 0.0 30.4
Source: Authors' calculations from the Luxembourg Income Study.
C. Elder Households
D. Childless Households
B. Childed Households
Appendix Table 2. Average National Imputation of Benefits
(in real 2000 US PPP dollars)
Cash and Near 
Cash Transers
Percent Shares
A. All Households
Noncash BenefitsCash and Near 
Cash Transfers
(Most Inequality) 1 United States 5.43 United States 3.65 United States 4.86
2 United Kingdom 4.54 United Kingdom 3.49 United Kingdom 4.18
3 Australia 4.22 Canada 3.34 Australia 4.05
4 Canada 3.99 Australia 3.31 Canada 4.03
5 France 3.53 Belgium 3.17 Belgium 3.74
6 Germany 3.29 France 3.00 France 3.61
7 Belgium 3.19 Finland 3.06 Finland 3.48
8 Netherlands 3.12 Germany 2.93 Germany 3.47
9 Sweden 2.95 Netherlands 2.80 Netherlands 3.28
(Least Inequality) 10 Finland 2.90 Sweden 2.69 Sweden 3.17
Average 3.72 Average 3.14 Average 3.79
Appendix Table 3. Ranking of Countries: ALL Person Inequality by 90/10 Ratio
Source: Authors' calculations from Figure 8.
DPI FI
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